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REMEDIES-THE ApPEARANCE OF ACCESS: DEAF DEFENDANTS
AND THE MASSACHUSETTS JUDICIARy-JUSTICE?
INTRODUCTION

A.

The Hypothetical

John SandovaP is an indigent nineteen-year-old DeaP man ac
cused of sexual assault on a minor. He has a court-appointed de
fense attorney. He has been arrested and arraigned and is being
held without bail pending trial. He has been in jail for two years.
John's prolonged stay in jail is partly the result of the seven times
his proceedings have been continued due to the lack of legally qual
ified ASLlEnglish interpreters3 in the court. Each time a motion
hearing or status conference is continued for lack of an interpreter,
it is a month or more before it can be rescheduled. John's attorney
has an important strategy though, which precludes him from com
plaining about the lack of a speedy trial. He is trying to get John's
confession suppressed because it was made to police officers with
out a qualified interpreter present-in violation of the Massachu
setts Interpreter Law. 4 Each time the proceedings are continued,
his point is made loud and clear for the judge that no justice can be
meted out in this case without the presence of a legally qualified
ASLlEnglish interpreter. The judge becomes increasingly frus
trated throughout the two years, often shouting out on record,
"Isn't there anything we can do to secure an interpreter for these
proceedings? "
1. Although John Sandoval is a fictional person, his story is a composite of true
stories related to the author by Deaf defendants, the author's own experiences, and
several accounts related to the author by Kellie Hickey, Legal Referral Specialist at the
Massachusetts Comm'n for the Deaf and Hard of Hearing (MCDHH). All identifying
information has been removed.
2. "Deaf' is capitalized here because it refers to people who not only have hear
ing loss, but who also identify as members of the Deaf community, a linguistic and
cultural minority. When referring to those people with hearing loss who do not identify
as members of the Deaf community, but rather who live, socialize, and work completely
in the non-Deaf world, "deaf" will be used.
3. The term ASL refers to "American Sign Language." For further definition and
discussion, see infra Part I.C
4. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 221, § 92A (2004); see infra note 5.
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With an interpreter present the judge finally grants the motion
to suppress. s He binds the interpreter over for trial and the case
goes forward. But without John's confession the prosecution's case
is weak and John is acquitted. Meanwhile, because the judge has
bound the interpreter over for the two day trial, four other court
proceedings that the interpreter was scheduled for must be
continued.
John's lawyer immediately files a multi-party civil suit against
the Massachusetts Commission for the Deaf and Hard of Hearing
(MCDHH) and the Justices of the Superior Court of Hampden
County for violation of the Interpreter Law. The complaint also
alleges violations of the rights of John and several other Deaf de
fendants, under article 12 of the Massachusetts Constitution, to a
speedy trial, to be present for the proceedings against them, to con
front witnesses against them, and to meaningful access to counse1. 6
The suit also alleges violations of the Deaf defendants' due process
rights.
The Problem

B.

In 1985, the Massachusetts legislature charged MCDHH with a
host of mandates, including providing and ensuring the provision of
qualified ASLIEnglish interpreters for court proceedings.7
MCDHH has not met its burden as charged by the Commonwealth,
which has contributed to an interpreter shortage. 8 The question is
5.

MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 221, § 92A. The Interpreter Law states in pertinent part:
Whenever a deaf or hearing-impaired person is arrested for an alleged
violation of a criminal law, including a local ordinance, the arresting officer
shall procure and arrange payment for a qualified interpreter to assist such
person regarding any interrogation, warning, notification of rights, or taking of
a statement. No answer, statement, or admission, written or oral, made by a
deaf or hearing-impaired person in response to any question by a law enforce
ment officer or any prosecutor, in his official capacity, in any criminal proceed
ing may be used against such deaf or hearing-impaired person unless such
statement was made or elicited through a qualified interpreter and was made
knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently or, in the case of waiver of interpreter,
unless the court makes a special finding that any statement made by such deaf
or hearing-impaired person was made knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently.
Id. (emphasis added).
6. MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. 12 ("No subject shall be held to answer for any crimes
of offence, until the same is fully and plainly, substantially and formally, described to
him ...."). Unless otherwise stated, "constitution" refers to the Massachusetts Consti
tution throughout this Note.
7. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 221, § 92A; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, § 194 (2004).
8. See ELIZA ANDERSON, MASS. HUMAN SERVS. COAL., PEOPLE FIRST: DISABIL.
ITY ANALYSIS OF THE STATE BUDGET 89-90 (2005), available at http://www.mass.gov/
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what can be done to pressure the legislature into properly funding
MCDHH so that it can effectively recruit and train interpreters for
the courts. This Note argues that the Supreme Judicial Court has
two choices: it can do here what it did in Lavallee v. Justices in the
Hampden Superior Court,9 and release Deaf defendants who do not
have access to counsel due to the lack of access to qualified inter
preters. lO In the alternative, the court can address this problem
through a writ of mandamus ordering MCDHH to recruit, train,
and retain an adequate number of interpreters qualified to work in
court and legal settings. In response, MCDHH-not funded for an
undertaking of such magnitude-will necessarily approach the leg
islature for permanent funding earmarked for legal interpreter
training.
This Note will first argue that Deaf defendants are currently in
the same bind that indigent non-Deaf defendants were in when
Lavallee was decided and, as such, should be freed within a reason
able time if no interpreters are available. Second, chapter 211, sec
tion 3 of the Massachusetts General Laws authorizes the court to
issue a mandamus under extraordinary circumstances. l l This Note
will therefore argue that the severe shortage of qualified interpret
ers available to work in the courts, which precludes Deaf defend
ants from legally and meaningfully participating in the proceedings
against them, is an appropriately extraordinary circumstance to
warrant a writ of mandamus. Both measures would put pressure on
the legislature to appropriate funds to ensure that an adequate
mddc/documents/people_firsChlfy06.pdf (identifying the shortage of legal interpreters,
stating that "[t]he shortage is hampering the Commission's ability to function and indi
viduals' capacity to access basic legal, emergency and human services supports"); MASS.
HUMAN SERVS. COAL., PEOPLE FIRST: WHAT MASSACHUSETTS DOES FOR PEOPLE
WITH DISABILITIES 38 (2005) [hereinafter PEOPLE FIRST], available at http://www.mass.
gov/mddc/documents/people_first_h2fy06.pdf (identifying the severe shortage of gener
alist ASUEnglish interpreters). This author is a nationally certified ASLlEnglish inter
preter qualified by MCDHH to work in court and legal settings. She has firsthand,
intimate knowledge of the state of interpreter services in Massachusetts. Statistics are
not always available, despite the best efforts of this author to obtain them. Some anec
dotal evidence will be used in this Note, although every effort has been made to cite
authority where possible.
9. Lavallee v. Justices in the Hampden Superior Court, 812 N.E.2d 895 (Mass.
2004).
10. Id. at 912 (ordering the release of indigent defendants not assigned counsel
after seven days). "[T]he principle[] of procedural due process ... include[s] the right
to be heard, which necessarily includes the right to be heard by counsel." Id. at 902
(citing Commonwealth v. Torres, 806 N.E.2d 895, 897 (Mass. 2004».
11. See infra Part II.E.2; see also MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 211, § 3 (2004).
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number of interpreters are recruited, trained, and paid to work in
court and legal settings.
Part I of this Note will outline a brief history of the circum
stances in Massachusetts that led to the current shortage of quali
fied court and legal interpreters. Part I will also describe the Deaf
community, its language (ASL), culture, traditions, and norms. Fi
nally, Part I will examine relevant case law. Part II argues that,
based on analogous case law, the solution to the interpreter
shortage should be the release of Deaf defendants who cannot be
provided interpreters in a timely fashion or, alternatively, the issu
ance of mandamus. The judiciary can and should intervene when
the civil rights of a group of individuals are being violated by the
policies of inaction, and sometimes overt obstruction, promulgated
by the agency charged with their protection.
I.

BACKGROUND

There is a crisis-level shortage of qualified ASLIEnglish inter
preters available to work in the courts in Massachusetts. 12 The lack
of interpreters for Deaf defendants in the courts violates both state
statutes and the Massachusetts Constitution. 13 The Supreme Judi
cial Court of Massachusetts has made it clear that such deprivation
of defendants' rights to counsel and to access the proceedings
against them is impermissible. 14 Not only are Deaf defendants'
rights violated by the shortage of interpreters, but the judiciary's
ability to mete out justice is also stymied.
12. ANDERSON, supra note 8, at 89-90 (identifying the shortage of legal interpret
ers, stating "[t]he shortage is hampering the Commission's ability to function and indi
viduals' capacity to access basic legal, emergency and human services supports").
13. See id.; MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. 12. Although it will become clear throughout
this Note that Deaf defendants' federal constitutional rights are also implicated, other
articles have addressed that issue already. Therefore, this Note only discusses the Mas
sachusetts justice system. See, e.g., Michele-Lee Berko, Comment, Preserving the Sixth
Amendment Rights of the Deaf Criminal Defendant, 97 DICK. L. REV. 101 (1992); Greg
ory G. Sarno, Annotation, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Use or Nonuse Of Inter
preter at Prosecution of Hearing-Impaired Defendant, 86 A.L.R. 4TH 698 (2007); Jo
Anne Simon, The Use of Interpreters for the Deaf and the Legal Community's Obliga
tion to Comply with the ADA, 8 J.L. & HEALTH 155 (1994); Jamie McAlister, Deaf and
Hard-of-Hearing Criminal Defendants: How You Gonna Get Justice if You Can't Talk to
the Judge?, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 163 (1994); Attorneys, Deaf Clients and the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 2004-JAN W. VA. LAW. 30; Michele LaVigne & McCay Vernon, An
Interpreter Isn't Enough: Deafness, Language, and Due Process, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 843.
14. Lavallee, 812 N.E.2d 895.
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The Scope of the Problem and the Supporting Statistics

Deaf defendants in the United States require the use of ASLI
English interpreters in legal proceedings; without interpreters, Deaf
defendants would not be able to exercise their Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights under the U.S. Constitution. IS Such interpreters
must be specially trained and highly skilled to work in court and
legal settings. The Massachusetts legislature recognized these
needs when it passed and later amended the Interpreter Law-a
law distinct from spoken language statutes-that exclusively pro
tects the communication access rights of Deaf people in the
courts.1 6 The legislature recognized that unless this standard is met,
Deaf defendants' constitutional rights will be violatedP
The legislature further recognized the unique communication
access needs of the Deaf community by establishing MCDHH and
charging it with the duties of both qualifying interpreters and refer
ring appropriate interpreters to court and legal assignments. I8
However, there are not nearly enough interpreters who are quali
fied to work in court and legal settings to meet the needs of Deaf
defendants,I9 let alone all the other Deaf parties who need inter
preters for their proceedings. 20 For example, Deaf people who
have been arrested sit in jail sometimes for days without under
standing what is happening to them or why they were arrested be
cause of the length of time it takes to obtain the services of an
interpreter. Sometimes, as in the hypothetical case of John Sando
val, their time in jail is much longer. Such deprivation of freedom
violates part I, article 12, of the Massachusetts Constitution, which
guarantees a defendant's right to due process, to understand the
15. For a comprehensive examination of the nexus between the provision of qual
ified ASLIEnglish interpreters for Deaf defendants and their constitutional rights, see
Berko, supra note 13; Sarno, supra note 13; Simon, supra note 13; McAlister, supra
note 13; Attorneys, Deaf Clients and the Americans with Disabilities Act, supra note 13;
LaVigne & Vernon, supra note 13.
16. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 221, § 92A (2004).
17. Id.; see also MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. 12 ("No subject shall be held to answer
for any crimes of offence, until the same is fully and plainly, substantially and formally,
described to him ....").
18. An Act Establishing a Commission for the Deaf and Hard of Hearing, ch.
716,1985 Mass. Acts 1106 (codified as amended at MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, §§ 191-199
(2004».
19. Although the shortage affects Deaf people in all legal settings, the focus of
this Note is solely on Deaf defendants.
20. Telephone Interview with KeIlie Hickey, Statewide Court and Legal Inter
preter Referral Specialist, Mass. Comm'n for the Deaf & Hard of Hearing, in
Dorchester, Mass. (Oct. 21, 2005).
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charges against him or her, and to counsel.21 In order to comforta
bly fill the existing interpreter requests,22 which do not include jury
duty,23 MCDHH would need to more than double its pool of quali

21. MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. 12. Article 12 states in pertinent part, "No subject
shall be held to answer for any crimes of offence, until the same is fully and plainly,
substantially and formally, described to him." Id. It goes on to track the due process,
jury of one's peers, right to face witnesses, and right to remain silent language of the
U.S. Constitution, which states "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall ... be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to
have the assistance of counsel for his defense." Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
22. From January 2004 through December 2004 there were 1274 official requests
for interpreters for court or legal assignments in Massachusetts. Statistics compiled by
Kellie Hickey, Statewide Court and Legal Interpreter Referral Specialist, Mass.
Comm'n for the Deaf & Hard of Hearing, in Dorchester, Mass. (Apr. 30, 2007) (on file
with author). Of these requests, 62 were withdrawn by the requestor (this could be for
reasons such as the case being settled or the defendant pleading out, but it could also be
because the referral specialist could predict that no interpreter would be available), and
102 requests were cancelled (this could be due to attorney or witness illness, miss
cheduling, or other reasons). Id. Of the 1274 official requests, only 847 were filled. Id.
Ms. Hickey forewarned the author that because she is the one person holding every
one's schedules and doing legal referral for the whole state, not all of the unfilled as
signments are reflected in these statistics. She is able to see when it will be impossible
to fill requests based on the number of requests she has already filled for a specific time
period and persuade court clerks to get a continuance for those conflicting dates. She
informed the author that there are "many more" continuances, or technically unfilled
requests, that are not reflected in the above mentioned statistics. E-mail from Kellie
Hickey, Statewide Court & Legal Interpreter Referral Specialist, Mass. Comm'n for the
Deaf & Hard of Hearing, in Dorchester, Mass., to author (Sept. 1,2005) (on file with
author). Because not all of the continuances are reflected in these numbers, the actual
fill rate is probably considerably lower. Id. Of the total 1274 requests, 369 were for two
or more interpreters. Statistics compiled by Kellie Hickey, supra. Because there are so
few interpreters available, the requests requiring two or more interpreters are especially
difficult to fill. Id. Every time these requests are made, the ability of the referral spe
cialist to fill them goes down. Telephone Interview with Kellie Hickey, supra note 20.
23. MCDHH currently has a moratorium on referring interpreters for Deaf peo
ple selected for jury duty. Form Letter from Kellie Hickey, Statewide Court & Legal
Interpreter Referral Specialist, Mass. Comm'n for the Deaf & Hard of Hearing, to
members of the Deaf community seeking to participate in jury duty (Sept. 1,2005) (on
file with author). The policy is unwritten, but the letter, prepared by Kellie Hickey
which, is sent to Deaf people who want to participate when called for jury duty reads, in
pertinent part:
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fied interpreters. 24 In fact, under the current system, the referral
specialist at MCDHH, seeing that no interpreters will be available,
often convinces court clerks to reschedule proceedings according to
when interpreters will be available. 25 Thus, many requests are di
verted to future dates without ever being officially logged as "un
filled. "26 To fully meet the needs of Deaf people involved in the
legal system, the number of interpreters would probably have to
increase threefold. 27
This crisis-level shortage of interpreters qualified to work in
court and legal settings is not new. The pool of qualified interpret
ers has been more or less the same for thirty years. 28 If anything,
because the pool of interpreters is static but the number of requests

Currently requests for Jury Duty in Massachusetts are unfilled. Although
we are aware of the public outcry from members of the Deaf community want
ing to perform their civic duty, there are many factors that continue [to] block
communication access at this time.
In Massachusetts, there exist only a handful of legally qualified sign lan
guage interpreters. . .. The demand is so high for these individuals, that often
times they are booked months in advance. Any jury assignment would require
at least two interpreters ... if not more. With so few qualified people in the
state, we must prioritize our resources by scheduling interpreters ... for daily
court proceedings (i.e. arraignments, pretrials, trials) and other out of court
legal requests (i.e. arrests, attorney client meetings, depositions).
There has been an agreement between MCDHH and AOTClJury Com
missioners office that when we receive the requests for jury duty, they are
postponed for at least a year due [to] the lack of interpreters .... Until there
is an increase in legally qualified interpreters ... in Massachusetts, we do not
foresee a change in filling these requests.
Id.

24. As of the writing of this Note, there are thirteen ASUEnglish interpreters
deemed qualified to work in the Massachusetts courts who actually reside and work in
the Commonwealth. Telephone Interview with Kellie Hickey, supra note 20. Of those
thirteen interpreters, the approximate equivalent of 4.5 interpreters are willing and able
to accept court assignments on a consistent, full-time basis. [d.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. This estimate is based on the professional opinion of Kellie Hickey, Statewide
Court & Legal Interpreter Referral Specialist, Massachusetts Comm'n for the Deaf &
Hard of Hearing. Id.
28. Interview with Joan Wattman, Massachusetts court & legal interpreter since
1976, in Plainfield, Mass. (Aug. 5, 2005).
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continues to rise,29 the crisis is worse now than it was even ten years
ago. 30
B.

The History and Laws that Led to the Ongoing Interpreter
Crisis

"Disability advocates have been very successful in using stat
utes and legislative action, rather than court cases, to address equal
protection by building on the traditional government function of
social welfare. "31 Before the Americans with Disabilities Act,32 or
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,33 were passed, Massa
chusetts led other states in passing the critically important Inter
preter Law, which applies only to Deaf people, in 1971.34 The text
of the original law, which has since been amended,35 provided, in
relevant part:
29. Requests continue to rise because of the passage of the Americans with Disa
bilities Act (ADA) and an increased level of judicial awareness of its mandates,
MCDHH's educational presentations to the courts and law enforcement about courts'
duties to Deaf parties, and the rising visibility of interpreters in general. See Americans
with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.c. § 12101 (2000). Tennessee v. Lane was the seminal case
determining that all qualified people with disabilities have a right to unhindered access
to the courts. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004). The case involved a disabled
man who was a criminal defendant in Tennessee. Id. at 513-14. Due to the lack of
wheelchair access at his local courthouse, he was forced to crawl up the courthouse
stairs to appear at his proceeding. Id. When the proceeding was continued, he refused
to crawl up the stairs again or allow the court's personnel to carry him on the subse~
quent date. Id. at 514. He sued the state of Tennessee under Title II of the ADA,
which prohibits discrimination against qualified people with disabilities with respect to
public services. Id. at 513. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether Title II
was appropriately exercised by Congress as part of its enforcement power under the
Fourteenth Amendment, as applied to cases implicating the fundamental right of a per
son to access the courts. Id. The Court held that it was indeed a valid exercise of
Congress's enforcement power and that Title II governs in cases concerning qualified
people with disabilities paving access to the courts. Id. at 533-34.
30. Interview with Joan Wattman, supra note 28.
31. Sarah S. Geer, When "Equal" Means "Unequal"-And Other Legal Conun
drums for the Deaf Community, in LANGUAGE AND THE LAW IN DEAF COMMUNITIES
82, 118-19 (Ceil Lucas, ed. 2003).
32. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.c. § 12101 (prohibiting discrimina
tion against qualified people with disabilities in employment and state and public ac
commodations, including access to courts).
33. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 394 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000)) (prohibiting discrimination against people with dis
abilities by entities receiving federal funding and specifically requiring the use of quali
fied interpreters for Deaf people).
34. Act of June 29, 1971, ch. 459, 1971 Mass. Acts 306 (codified as amended at
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 221, § 92A (2004)) (providing for the appointment of interpreters
for Deaf people in Superior Court).
35. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 221, § 92A (2004).
;0',

.'
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In any proceeding in the superior court to which a deaf person is
a party or a witness, the presiding justice shall appoint a qualified
interpreter to interpret the proceedings for such person, unless
such person waives in writing the appointment of such inter
preter. For the purposes of this section, a person shall be deemed
to be deaf if he has a physical handicap which prevents him from
speaking or from hearing fully.36

Then, in 1974, just after the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 went into
effect, the Massachusetts legislature passed the law establishing the
Massachusetts Office on Deafness (MOD), to be housed under the
auspices of the Massachusetts Rehabilitation Commission. 37 The
purpose of establishing the MOD was to address the growing con
cern that Deaf people's unique communication access needs were
not being addressed by the newly burgeoning disability-rights
movement, and that as such, Deaf people were falling through the
cracks on every front, as well as suffering discrimination unique to
their population. 38
It was not until 1978 that the federal government passed the
Federal Court Interpreters Act39 and many states followed suit.
The purpose of this law was to protect the constitutional rights of
Deaf people and others who spoke languages other than English in
court and legal proceedings.40 The public and its elected represent
atives were beginning to understand that without interpretation,
Deaf people and people who spoke languages other than English
were not able to meaningfully participate in any legal proceeding.41
They were realizing that
too often ... constitutional mandates [we]re violated out of igno
rance and fear. Ignorance on the part of the criminal justice sys
tem because [it] d[id] not know the actual consequences of
deafness ... and fear ... because the system d[id] not understand
deaf persons and deaf persons do not understand the system. 42
,I~·t.

36. Act Providing for the Appointment of Interpreters for the Deaf in Court Pro
ceedings, ch. 459, 1971 Mass. Acts 306.
37. An Act Establishing an Office of Deafness in the Massachusetts Rehabilita
tion Commission, ch. 805, 1974 Mass. Acts 804, repealed by An Act Establishing a Com
mission for the Deaf and Hard of Hearing, ch. 716, § 1, 1985 Mass. Acts 1106.
38. H.R. 5679, 168th Gen. Ct., 2d. Ann. Sess., § 1(1)-(3) (Mass. 1974).
39. Court Interpreters Act, Pub. L. No. 95-539, 92 Stat. 2040 (1978) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.c. § 1827 (2000».
40. Rob Hoopes, Trampling Miranda: Interrogating Deaf Suspects, in LANGUAGE
AND THE LAW IN DEAF COMMUNITIES, supra note 31, at 21, 28.
41. Id.
42. McAlister, supra note 13, at 163-64.
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But Massachusetts was at the forefront, leading the way by passing
the Interpreter Law and the laws establishing the MOD.43
There is little legislative history available to describe what hap
pened in Massachusetts in the 1970s that led to the passage of these
vital state laws. But it is clear from subsequent events that between
1974 and 1985 Deaf people came together in Massachusetts to
lobby for their communication access rights. 44 In June of 1985, the
Task Force on Deafness submitted its official report to the Secre
tary of the Executive Office of Human Services. 45 The Task Force
stressed the Deaf community's pressing need for an independent
agency to protect and ensure its rights. 46 It proposed the formation
of MCDHH,47 and less than a year later, by executive order of
then-Governor Michael Dukakis, the agency was established. 48
MCDHH was a new agency, separate from the Massachusetts Re
habilitation Commission, with its own budget and newly appointed
Deaf commissioner, Barbara Jean Wood. 49
Among other tasks, the legislature charged MCDHH with
promulgating and coordinating public policy, advocating for the
needs of Deaf people in the Commonwealth, providing and ensur
ing the provision of interpreter services, ensuring the accessibility
and quality of existing services, and recommending new services to
the Governor as needed. 50 The current section of the law entitled
"Functions of Commission" states that MCDHH "shall serve as the
principal agency of the commonwealth, on behalf of deaf and hard
of hearing persons."51 Further, MCDHH explains in its mission
statement:
43. An Act Providing for Interpreters for the Deaf in Court Proceedings, ch. 459,
1971 Mass. Acts 306 (codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 221, § 92A (1971»; An Act
Establishing an Office of Deafness in the Massachusetts Rehabilitation Commission, ch.
805, 1974 Mass. Acts 804, repealed by An Act Establishing a Commission for the Deaf
and Hard of Hearing, ch. 716, § 1, 1985 Mass. Acts 1106 (codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 6, §§ 191-199 (1985».
44. TASK FORCE ON DEAFNESS, EXECUTIVE OFF. OF HUMAN SERVS., REPORT OF
THE TASK FORCE ON DEAFNESS (1985).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 14.
47. Id.
48. Agency Established for the Hearing Disabled, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 5, 1986, at
35, available at 1986 WLNR 279392 (Westlaw).
49. Jean Dietz, Head of Deaf Commission Sworn In: Silent Applause Greets New
Leader, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 21, 1986, at 25, available at 1986 WLNR 278258
(Westiaw).
50. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, §§ 191-199 (2004).
51. Id. § 194.
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All functions and services are carried out in order to enable deaf
and hard of hearing individuals to have access to information,
services, education, and opportunities which will be equal to
those of able-bodied people who hear and which will enable each
deaf and hard of hearing individual to live productively and inde
pendently while assuming fullest responsibilities as a citizen. 52

After MCDHH was established, the legislature amended the
Interpreter Law several times, expanding its reach and charging
MCDHH with ever more responsibility in protecting the communi
cation access rights of Deaf people. The current version of the In
terpreter Law provides, in pertinent part:
In any proceeding in any court in which a deaf . . . person is a
party or a witness, or proceeding involves a juvenile whose par
ent, or parents, is deaf ... or in any proceeding before an execu
tive or legislative board . . . or other body of the state ... such
court or body shall appoint a qualified interpreter to interpret the
proceedings, unless such deaf ... person knowingly, voluntarily,
and intelligently waives, in writing the appointment of such inter
preter.... In no event shall the failure of the deaf . .. person to
request an interpreter be deemed a waiver of such appointment.
. . . . In any criminal proceeding wherein counsel has been
appointed to represent an indigent defendant, the court shall also
appoint a qualified interpreter for such defendant, whenever such
defendant is deaf . .. to assist in communication with counsel in
all phases of the preparation and presentation of the case.
"Qualified interpreter" ... an interpreter shall be deemed
qualified . .. by the Office of Deafness . . . . Said office of deaf
ness shall coordinate all requests for qualified interpreters and
shall maintain a list of all such interpreters from which it shall fill
such requests. 53

Not only did the legislature expand the law from its original form to
include all legal proceedings, not just superior court proceedings, as
was provided in the 1971 version,54 but it also designated MCDHH
as the only entity empowered to determine interpreters' qualifica
52. Mass. Comm'n for the Deaf & Hard of Hearing, Vision and Mission State
ment, http://www.mass.gov/mcdhh (follow the "Vision and Mission Statement" hyper
link) (last visited May 9, 2007).
53. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 221, § 92A (2004) (emphasis added). The Office on
Deafness is now called MCDHH, but the law has not been changed to reflect this.
54. Act Providing for the Appointment of Interpreters For the Deaf in Court
Proceedings, ch. 459, 1971 Mass. Acts 306.

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

926

[Vol. 29:915

tions for court and legal interpreting assignments. 55 Further, it
mandated that MCDHH would become the sole entity that would
maintain the list of qualified interpreters and refer them on re
quest. 56 This, in effect, deprived the court of its ability to select and
hire interpreters itself, giving MCDHH that power instead.57 In
deed, for a judge or an attorney to do her own interpreter referral
would be a violation of Massachusetts law. 58

C.

ASL is a Complete and Separate Language from English and
Deaf People Often Are Not Fluent Users of English

Courts do not necessarily understand why ASLlEnglish inter
preters are so important to Deaf people's access to the courtS.59
Importantly, ASL is a complete and rich language, completely sepa
rate from English, with its own vocabulary, grammar, and syntax. 60
ASL is in no way dependent on spoken or written English, which is
linear, but instead is a visual/gestural language communicated in
space and perceived through the eyes; there is no written form. 61
People who identify as part of the Deaf community use ASL as
their primary mode of communication. 62 In addition to using a dif
ferent language than the mainstream popUlation, Deaf people are
members of a unique and separate culture. 63 This creates an addi
tionallayer of complexity for Deaf people, because "[d]ifferences in
language go hand in hand with differences in culture, since lan
guage is an integral part of culture."64 According to the most re
cent demographic information compiled and analyzed by MCDHH,
55.
56.
57.

MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 221, § 92A.
Id.
Id.
58. Id.; An Act Establishing a Commission for the Deaf and Hard of Hearing, ch.
716,1985 Mass. Acts 1106-1107 (codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, § 194 (1985» (stat
ing that MCDHH is the only entity allowed to refer interpreters to court and legal
settings).
59. SUBCOMM. ON COURT INTERPRETERS, COMM. ON FAIRNESS & EQUAL Ac
CESS TO JUSTICE, A REPORT ON INTERPRETER SERVICES IN THE VERMONT COURTS 2, 6
(2004) available at http://www.vermontjudiciary.orgiLibraryIPDF/resources/Rpts/
interrpt.pdf.
60. HARLAN LANE, WHEN THE MIND HEARS 213 (Vintage Books 1989) (1984).
61. Id. at 212-13; see also Nat'l Inst. on Deafness & Other Communications Dis
orders, American Sign Language, http://www.nicdc.nih.gov/health/hearinglasl.asp (last
visited May 9, 2007).
62. CHARLOTTE BAKER & CAROL PADDEN, AMERICAN SIGN LANGUAGE: A
LOOK AT ITs HISTORY, STRUCTURE AND COMMUNITY 3 (1978).

63.
64.

Id.

Roger W. Shuy, The Language Problems of Minorities in the Legal Setting, in
LANGUAGE AND THE LAW IN DEAF COMMUNITIES, supra note 31, at 1.
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there are approximately 13,300 culturally Deaf people (users of
ASL) in Massachusetts. 65
In addition to the fact that ASL is a separate language from
English, the pervasive problem of poor education in the United
States has led to many Deaf people never learning English as a sec
ond language. 66 Most Deaf adults have a fourth grade reading
leve1. 67 The Miranda warning is supposedly written at an eighth
grade level,68 although there is not consensus in the field of ASLI
English interpreters that this is SO.69 Regardless, most Deaf adults,
because of their reading level, do not have access to the warning
through spoken or written English. Further, there is a pervasive
misconception that all Deaf people can speak or at least speech
read (lip-read), and if they profess not to be able to, then they are
just being lazy or uncooperative, or worse, that they are trying to
run a scam on the people around them who can hear (hereinafter
"hearing people")Jo However, speech-reading is a complex and in
65. Mass. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Mass. Comm'n for the Deaf & Hard
of Hearing, Demographic Information on People Who are Deaf or Hard of Hearing,
http://www.mass.gov/mcdhh (follow the "Demographic Information on People Who
Are Deaf or Hard of Hearing" hyperlink) (last visited May 9, 2007).
66. For a comprehensive examination of the factors leading to Deaf people's lack
of English literacy, see generally Annabelle Dyer et aI., Predictors of Reading Delay in
Deaf Adolescents: The Relative Contributions of Rapid Automatized Naming Speed and
Phonological Awareness and Decoding, 8 J. DEAF STUD. & DEAF EDUe. 215 (2003),
available at http://jdsde.oxfordjournals.orglcgi/reprint/8/3/215.pdf; HAROLD A. JOHN
SON, U.S. DEAF EDUCATION TEACHER PREPARATION PROGRAMS: A LOOK AT THE
PRESENT AND A VISION FOR THE FUTURE (2003), available at http://www.coe.ufl.edul
copsse/docs/IB-9/1IIB-9.pdf.
67. Dr. Jane Kelleher Fernandes, Deaf Education Today: The Status Quo, http://
clerccenter.gallaudet.edulProducts/Sharing-Ideas/deafedltsq.html (last visited May 9,
2007) ("Frank Bowe (1991) in Approaching Equality reiterated that deaf children seem
to reach a plateau at third grade reading comprehension levels."). In this Note, the
author specifically avoids using the word "illiterate," because although many Deaf
adults are not fluent in English, most Deaf users of ASL are fluent and fully literate in
ASL. Their culture is replete with ASL poetry, storytelling, and literature, with which
most Deaf adults are familiar and adept. See generally McAlister, supra note 13.
68. Sy DUBOW ET AL., LEGAL RIGHTS: THE GUIDE FOR DEAF AND HARD OF
HEARING PEOPLE 176 (5th ed. 2000).
69. Professional discussion with legal interpreters at the Iron Sharpens Iron Con
ference for Legal Interpreters in Atlanta, Georgia, in May 2004. The issue of whether
the Miranda warning is written at the eighth grade level was discussed but not resolved
at the court and legal interpreters training offered by AOTC and MCDHH, if the fall of
2000. See also AOTC AND MCDHH: THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM WITH EMPHASIS
ON THE MASSACHUSETTS COURT SYSTEM FOR INTERPRETERS SERVING DEAF AND
HARD OF HEARING INDIVIDUALS (Lewan a Clark ed., 2000) (training manual on file
with author).
70. See generally HARLAN LANE, THE MASK OF BENEVOLENCE: DISABLING THE
DEAF COMMUNITY (Vintage Books 1993) (1992); Los Angeles Comm'n on Assaults
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accurate art.?1 Only approximately 30 percent of speech sounds are
visible on the lips, the rest being formed in the mouth and throat.?2
Even the best lip-reader, under the perfect set of environmental
circumstances (with optimal lighting, no visual distractions, a calm
emotional state, and no obstructions to the speaker's mouth or
face), can only understand about 30 percent of verbal speech.73 As
author Beryl Lieff Benderly notes, "Few things so easily remove a
person from the normal life of society as a loss of hearing. The
person who cannot hear is a permanent foreigner in the country of
speech."74
D.

The Need for ASUEnglish Interpreters and the Process of
Qualifying Them
1.

The Qualification of Interpreters

The Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf, Inc. (RID, Inc.) was
established in 1964.75 It was incorporated in 1972,76 when it estab
lished a national testing system, creating professional standards for
ASLIEnglish interpreters in the United States.?7 In addition to de
veloping a generalist test for certifying interpreters to work in most
settings, RID, Inc. also developed a special certificate for interpret
ers desiring to work in court and legal settings, the Specialist Certif
icate: Legal (SC:L).78 This test is still used today by many states to
Against Women, Understanding Deafness, http://www.lacaaw.org/deaffaq.html (last vis
ited May 9, 2007); Off. for Disability Issues (New Zealand), History, http://www.odi.
govt.nz/what-we-do/nzsl-history.html (last visited May 9, 2007); WILLIAM E. HEWITT,
COURT INTERPRETATION: MODEL GUIDE FOR POLICY AND PRACTICE IN THE STATE
COURTS 166 (1995), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/wc/publications/Res_CtInte_
ModeIGuideChapter7Pub.pdf. The author's anecdotal experience, corroborated by ex
tensive conversations over many years with legal interpreter colleagues, as well as gen
eral media portrayal of Deaf people, also supports this statement.
71. McAlister, supra note 13, at 173.
72. Id. at 172.
73. Id.
74. BERYL LIEFF BENDERLY, DANCING WITHOUT MUSIC: DEAFNESS IN
AMERICA 25 (Gallaudet University Press 2002) (1980).
75. Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf, Inc., http://www.rid.org (last visited May
9,2007).
76. Id.
77. Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf, About NTS (National Testing System),
http://www.rid.org/education/testing/index.cfmlAID/82 (last visited May 9, 2007); Regis
try of Interpreters for the Deaf, About RID, http://www.rid.org.aboutRID/overview/
index.cfm (last visited May 9, 2007).
78. SPECIALIST CERTIFICATE: LEGAL (SC:L) EXAMINATION INFORMATION BUL
LETIN 3 (2006), available at http://www.rid.org/UserFileslFile/pdfs/Certification_
Documen ts/SCL_ Candida te_Bulletin. pdf.
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ensure that only the most skilled and highly trained interpreters are
working in the courtS.79
In Massachusetts, MCDHH is the agency responsible for en
suring the qualifications of such interpreters. 8o MCDHH recog
nizes the RID SC:L, but it also has its own stringent qualifying
system for those interpreters who want to work in the courtS. 81 This
has been true since the legislature originally charged the MOD
before it became MCDHH-with developing criteria for qualifying
legal interpreters to comply with the 1971 Interpreter Law. 82 When
the Interpreter Law was amended to include all court proceedings,
not just those happening in superior court, the legislature added the
requirement that MCDHH must develop its policies for qualifying
legal interpreters in conjunction with the Massachusetts Registry of
Interpreters for the Deaf, the local chapter of RID, Inc., and the
Massachusetts State Association of the Deaf, the local chapter of
the national political and social justice action group of the Deaf
community-the National Association of the Deaf. 83
So, even before RID, Inc. established its national testing sys
tem in 1972 to ensure that interpreters had minimum qualifications,
the Massachusetts legislature already understood that Deaf defend
ants and parties needed to be able to have court proceedings
presented to them in ASL, as evidenced by the passage of the 1971
Interpreter Law. The qualifying system MCDHH developed in re
sponse to this legislative mandate is still used today by the agency,
side by side with, or sometimes instead of, the RID SC:L to assure
that qualified interpreters are working in Massachusetts courtS.84
79. /d.
80. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 221, § 92A (2004) ("[MCDHH] shall coordinate all re
quests for qualified interpreters and shall maintain a list of all such interpreters from
which it shall fill requests. ").
81. /d. MCDHH deems interpreters qualified "based upon the recommendations
of the Massachusetts Registry of the Deaf, the Massachusetts State Association of the
Deaf and other appropriate agencies." Id.
82. An Act Providing for the Appointment of Interpreters for The Deaf in Supe
rior Court Proceedings, ch. 459, 1971 Mass. Acts 306 (codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
221, § 92A (1971».
83. An Act Establishing a Commission for the Deaf and Hard of Hearing, ch.
716,1985 Mass. Acts 1106 (codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 221, § 92A (2004».
84. Based on the author's personal knowledge. There is no written policy on this
from MCDHH. The author was "MCDHH approved" to work as an interpreter in the
courts prior to receiving her SC:L, having completed a rigorous training program and
over one hundred hours of extern ship under a seasoned legal interpreter. Of the thir
teen interpreters qualified to work in the Massachusetts courts, only three hold the
SC:L. Telephone interview with Kellie Hickey, supra note 20. The other ten are "ap
proved" by MCDHH to work in courts and other legal settings. Id.
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The Need for Qualified Interpreters in Court

Having qualified and highly skilled interpreters working in the
courts and other legal settings is critical to Deaf parties' under
standing of the proceedings, especially for Deaf criminal defend
ants.85 Without the aid of an interpreter, a Deaf defendant is
effectively denied access to those proceedings, although such access
is guaranteed by the Massachusetts Constitution. 86 Massachusetts
law states that "[a] person accused of crime shall at his trial be al
lowed to be heard by counsel, to defend himself, to produce wit
nesses and proofs in his favor and to meet the witnesses produced
against him face to face. "87 The legislature strove to ensure that
Deaf people would be able to communicate with counsel, aid in
their own defense, and in all ways participate meaningfully in any
proceedings in which they were involved. 88 It made sense that the
agency to oversee and ensure the highest standards for interpreters
would be MCDHH, with its Deaf commissioner, its commitment to
hiring Deaf staff, and its knowledge of Deaf people's language and
culture. 89 Standards such as the RID SC:L and the Massachusetts
approval process for qualified interpreters desiring to work in the
courts and legal settings are critical. Unless such standards are
maintained by people who understand ASL and the interpreting
process, any person who looked to court personnel like they could
sign would end up working in the courtS.90
85. REPORT ON INTERPRETER SERVICES IN THE VERMONT COURTS, supra note
59, at 6.
86. The Massachusetts Constitution states, in pertinent part, "No subject shall be
held to answer for any crimes or offence, until the same is fully and plainly, substan
tially and formally, described to him." MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. 12. It goes on to track
the due process, jury of one's peers, right to face witnesses, and right to remain silent
language of the U.S. Constitution. [d. For a comprehensive examination of the case
law that supports this proposition, see Berko, supra note 13; Sarno, supra note 13.
87. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 263, § 5 (2004).
88. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 221, § 92A (2004).
89. For a complete understanding of the mandates of MCDHH, which include
hiring competent Deaf staff whenever possible, see MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, §§ 191-199
(2004).
90. Based on the author's anecdotal experience, having worked as an interpreter
throughout the United States; informal discussion with legal interpreters at the Iron
Sharpens Iron Conference for Legal Interpreters in Atlanta, GA, May 2004; informal
discussion with legal interpreter colleagues in New York, California, Tennessee, Ken
tucky, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, and Maine. Without stringent standards as to
who can and cannot work in court, courts tend to do what is convenient and low in cost,
regardless of the effectiveness of the communication with Deaf parties. [d.; see also
supra text accompanying note 59.
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Without clear, accurate interpretation by an interpreter who is
fluent in ASL, the Deaf defendant has little chance of understand
ing the message, which means little chance of understanding his
rights, his attorney, and the proceedings in general. 91 In United
States ex reI. Negron v. New York, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit observed, "[T]he government does not dispute the
nearly self-evident proposition that an indigent defendant who
could speak and understand no English would have a right to have
his trial proceedings translated so as to permit him to participate
effectively in his own defense."92 Indeed, a lack of appropriate
grammatical and "syntactic information can be catastrophic to the
Deaf individual[] . . . [it would be] somewhat akin to a hearing
person trying to make sense of the indecipherable word salads of
schizophrenics."93 In sum, by passing the 1971 Interpreter Law and
its 1985 amendment, and by establishing MCDHH and charging it
with qualifying interpreters for court and legal settings, the legisla
ture recognized the critical need for highly skilled ASLIEnglish in
terpreters in the courts in order to allow Deaf defendants to fully
participate in the proceedings against them.
E.

The Case Law
1.

Lavallee v. Justices in the Hampden Superior Court 94

The situation faced by John Sandoval in the hypothetical above
is similar to that faced by Nathaniel Lavallee in Lavallee v. Justices
in the Hampden Superior Court 95 in that neither had access to an
attorney, albeit for different reasons. On May 3, 2004, Mr. Lavallee
was arraigned without the benefit of counsel in the Springfield Dis
trict Court in Springfield, Massachusetts. 96 Thereafter, he and eigh
teen other indigent defendants, also arraigned without counsel
being present, were held in lieu of bailor under preventive deten
tion pending assignment of counsel and the start of their proceed
ings.97 Mr. Lavallee and the other indigent defendants faced this
predicament because of a crisis level shortage of counsel for indi
91.
92.
93.
94.
2004).
95.
96.
97.

Hoopes, supra note 40, at 33-34.
United States ex reI. Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d 386, 389 (2d Cir. 1970).
Hoopes, supra note 40, at 34.
Lavallee v. Justices in the Hampden Superior Court, 812 N.E.2d 895 (Mass.
Id. at 901.
Id.
[d. at 901-02.
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gent defendants available to the courtS.98 The shortage reached a
crisis level as a result of "the low rate of ... compensation [for
defense attorneys for the indigent] authorized by the annual budget
appropriation."99 The Supreme Judicial Court found that the rates
of pay for counsel that could be assigned to indigent defendants in
Massachusetts were "among the lowest in the nation."IOO As a re
sult, private attorneys stopped accepting defense bar appointments
from the courts and, on the dates at issue, there had been no de
fense counsel present in the Springfield District Court for two con
secutive days.1OI
The Supreme Judicial Court rejected the Attorney General's
suggestion that one solution to this shortage could be that the dis
trict attorney would charge more crimes as civil rather than criminal
infractions, thereby removing the need for appointed counse1.102
The court, in describing why this was not an appropriate remedy,
stated, "The discretion of the district attorney to charge certain of
fenses as civil infractions is an exclusively executive prerogative,
and a judge'S discretion with respect to sentencing should be based
on the customary factors governing disposition, not on the difficul
ties of securing counsel for the defendant."103 The court was em
phasizing that not only was the legislature encroaching on the
court's boundaries, but also that the court would not, as a remedy,
encroach upon the executive. I04 Further, the court seemed to be
saying that it had a right to function as it always had without chang
ing or bending the rules because of the legislature's failure to raise
the pay of defense attorneys appointed to represent indigent
clients. lOS
In the end, the court found that indigent defendants were re
ceiving disparate treatment in the courts based on their economic
status, in violation of the Massachusetts Constitution. 106 It held
that incarcerating indigent defendants without providing access to
counsel violated those defendants' article 12 right to counsel, which
mirrors the Sixth Amendment right to counsel under the U.S. Con
98. See id. at 899.
99. [d. at 900.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 901.
102. Id. at 906-07.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 906.
106. Id.
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stitution. 107 The court found that the lack of defense counsel for
indigent defendants was a chronic problem; it led to the infringe
ment of their constitutional rights. 108 The court further found that
the cause of the shortage of private counsel for indigent defendants
was the low rate of pay authorized by the state legislature, com
bined with its chronic under-funding of the Committee for Public
Counsel Services (CPCS), the Commonwealth's publicly funded de
fense bar. 109 Without adequate funding, CPCS could not hire
enough staff attorneys to represent all of the indigent defendants
who needed their services; nor, regardless of funding, could CPCS
attorneys represent defendants where there were conflicts of inter
est.l1 o Private defense attorneys who could be assigned to indigent
defendants were needed to supplement the services provided by
CPCS.1 11 But the legislature had not increased the appropriation to
CPCS for private attorneys so it could pay a higher hourly rate, and
so over time, private attorneys took fewer and fewer cases until the
crisis-level shortage the Lavallee defendants faced had
developed. 112
The court concluded that "[t]he continuation of what is now an
unconstitutional state of affairs cannot be tolerated."113 In explain
ing its holding the court stated "Proceedings in which a defendant
cannot participate meaningfully may not be allowed to proceed."114
The court then held that indigent defendants who did not have
counsel appointed must be released after seven days, regardless of
the charges against them, and that all charges must be dismissed
without prejudice after forty-five days if counsel still had not been
appointed.l1 s In addressing the Attorney General's concerns about
the public's safety upon the release of potentially dangerous
criminals, the court stated that while it shared his concerns, the re
sponsibility for providing counsel to indigent defendants was
squarely on the State. 116 Although the court was "confident that all
branches [of state government WOUld] work diligently" to address
107.
108.
109.
110.

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. at 903; see U.S. CONST. amend VI;
Lavallee, 812 N.E.2d at 903.
Id. at 900.
Id.
Id. at 909.
See id. at 900-01.
Id. at 910.
Id. at 911.
Id. at 912.
Id. at 907, 910.

MASS. CONST.

pt. I, art. 12.
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the problem,117 it also intimated that by virtue of its disposition of
this case, it had the ability to put pressure on the legislature in par
ticular to find a monetary solution. 118 Within a month, the Massa
chusetts legislature raised the hourly pay rates for court-appointed
defense counsel.1 19
2.

Injunctive Relief under Judge Rotenberg Educational
Center and Sheriff of Suffolk County

Where injunctive relief to aggrieved parties could affect a pub
lic agency's ability to carry out its discretionary functions, the courts
give deference to the agency's interpretation or implementation of
its own regulations. 12o But when an agency's implementation of its
regulations violates the law, it is appropriate for courts to inter
vene. 121 Further, when an agency's policies encroach on the func
tions of the judiciary, the court can order a writ of mandamus
requiring the agency to take affirmative steps to eliminate such
encroachment. 122
The cases that govern here are Judge Rotenberg Educational
Center v. Commissioner of the Department of Mental Retardation
and Attorney General v. Sheriff of Suffolk County.123 In each of
these cases, the Supreme Judicial Court took the extraordinary step
of issuing a writ of mandamus ordering an executive body to take a
specific action.124 These cases stand for the proposition that man
damus can issue when (a) the legislature is not adequately funding a
program mandated to protect the constitutional rights of individuals
and the court deems it appropriate to put pressure on the legisla
ture to fully fund the program at issue; (b) an executive agency or
117. Id. at 910.
118. Id. at 908 (explaining what other state courts have done to put pressure on
their legislatures to raise the rates of pay for attorneys representing indigent clients).
119. SPANGENBERG GROUP, INDIGENT DEFENSE IN MASSACHUSETTS: A CASE
HISTORY OF REFORM 4 (2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/
downloads/sclaid/indigentdefenseIMAindigdefreform2005.pdf.
120. Correia v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 605 N.E.2d 1233, 1237 (Mass. 1993).
121. Id. ("When an agency's implementation of its regulations violates the law ...
it is entirely appropriate for a court to order relief. ").
122. See Att'y Gen. v. Sheriff of Suffolk County, 477 N.E.2d 361 (Mass. 1985).
123. Id.; Judge Rotenberg Educ. Ctr. v. Comm'r of Dep't of Mental Retardation,
677 N.E.2d 127 (Mass. 1997).
124. Sheriff of Suffolk County, 477 N.E.2d at 361 (affirming the trial judge's or
ders to the sheriff of Suffolk County); Judge Rotenberg Educ. Ctr., 677 N.E.2d at 152
(affirming the lower court's writ: "These considerations [that the trial court judge's or
der swept too broadly], however, do not affect our conclusion that the judge did not
otherwise exceed her authority").
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government body is obstructing the court from its timely and effi
cient administration of justice; or ( c) an agency takes action, or
takes no action, in violation of an individual's constitutional rights.
In Judge Rotenberg Educational Center, the families of several
children with autism and mental retardation sued the Department
of Mental Retardation (DMR) for failing to continue providing cer
tain aversive therapies that they felt would prolong the lives of their
children. 125 A substituted judgment order was entered by the pro
bate court in accordance with DMR's regulations, and the parties
entered into a settlement agreement.1 26 However, the director of
the Office for Children, a designee of DMR, refused in bad faith to
follow the order which required certifying the Judge Rotenberg Ed
ucational Center to provide the aversive therapy treatment. 127 The
Supreme Judicial Court, on appeal, acknowledged that it could not
replace DMR's judgment with its own regarding certification and
the applicable regulations, because that would be carrying out an
executive function. 128 However, the court held that it could require
that DMR (and thereby the Office for Children) follow the probate
court's order requiring certification where an agency meets DMR's
requirements for certification.129 In other words, an agency must
follow its own regulations which adhere to its legislative mandate,
and a court can compel the agency to do so. The court stressed that
allowing the department to ignore a judge's order would intrude
on the function of the courts, for there is no doubt that the ability
to enter orders is necessary to the' very existence of the court and
essential to the maintenance of the court's authority ... , It is just
this sort of intrusion that art. 30 prohibits. 13o

In Attorney General v. Sheriff of Suffolk County, the Supreme
Judicial Court issued a mandamus ordering the Boston City Council
to build a seventeen-story jail facility.!31 There was overcrowding
at the original jail facility that made it impossible for all of the pris
oners to be housed there. 132 This meant that many prisoners had to
125. Judge Rotenberg Educ. Ctr., 677 N.E.2d at 132-33.
126. Id. at 131-32.
127. Id. at 132.
128. Id. at 139.
129. Id. at 139-40.
130. Id. (citing Att'y Gen. v. Sheriff of Suffolk County, 477 N.E.2d 361 (Mass.
1985); Chief Admin. Justice of the Trial Court v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 533 N.E.2d
1313 (Mass. 1989)).
131. Att'y Gen. v. Sheriff of Suffolk County, 477 N.E.2d 361, 364 (Mass. 1985).
132. Id. at 362.
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be housed in, and transported to and from, other jails and prisons,
sometimes hours away.13 3 This made speedy administration of jus
tice for those prisoners problematic.134 The court found that the
City Council was encroaching upon the judiciary through its non
feasance in refusing to build the jail. 135 The court issued a manda
mus to force the City Council to build a particular jail that would
allow for the more efficient operation of the courts.136 In so doing,
the court stated "the City Council's failure to construct a suitable
jail ... may interfere with the functioning of the judicial branch,"
and that such interference was imperrnissible. 137
II.
A.

ANALYSIS

The Court Should Give Deaf Defendants Interpreters or
Let Them Go

The Supreme Judicial Court has clear precedent for releasing
Deaf defendants who have not received interpreter services in a
timely fashion. 138 The similarities between Lavallee and the hypo
thetical subject of this Note cannot be ignored. Without access to a
defense attorney through a legally qualified ASLlEnglish inter
preter, a Deaf defendant cannot meaningfully participate in the
proceedings, nor can he access counselor participate in his own
defense. Just as CPCS, with its inadequate state funding, was una
ble to procure enough attorneys from its staff to cover all of the
indigent defense needs for the state,139 so MCDHH, with its inade
quate state funding, is unable to procure enough interpreters to
cover all of the needs of Deaf defendants for the state. 140 Were the
court faced with an actual case like the hypothetical John Sando
val's, it should apply its reasoning used in Lavallee and hold that
Deaf defendants who are being held in jail and who do not receive
interpreter services in a timely manner should be released.
Regarding indigent defendants not having access to defense at
torneys, the Lavallee Court concluded that "the continuation of
133. Id.
134. See id.
135. Id. at 365.
136. Id. at 366.
137. Id. at 365.
138. Lavallee v. Justices in the Hampden Superior Court, 812 N.E.2d 895, 901
(Mass. 2004).
139. Id.
140. Id.; PEOPLE FIRST, supra note 8, at 37-38 (identifying the severe shortage of
ASUEnglish interpreters).
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what is now an unconstitutional state of affairs cannot be toler
ated,"141 and "[p]roceedings in which a defendant cannot partici
pate meaningfully may not be allowed to proceed."142 Likewise,
when a Deaf defendant like John Sandoval cannot communicate
with his attorney because no qualified ASLIEnglish interpreter is
available, he is unable to "participate meaningfully" in his own de
fense or in any proceedings against him. The Interpreter Law re
quires that courts appoint MCDHH-qualified interpreters for Deaf
defendants. 143 Without a qualified court interpreter, a Deaf defen
dant in practical effect does not have access to counsel and as such
should be released under the same terms as those set out in
Lavallee. 144
Further, as in Lavallee, Deaf defendants are routinely "held ...
without the assistance of counsel"145 for several days and some
times weeks, because no interpreters are available. 146 Holding
Deaf defendants without explanation while they wait for interpret
ers to become available deprives them of their liberty, which impli
cates "the principles of procedural due process in Article 12 of the
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights."147 One of the rights impli
cated is "the right to be heard, which necessarily includes the right
to be heard by counsel."148 Without the assistance of an inter
preter, Deaf defendants cannot be heard by the courts or by coun
sel, and therefore, their article 12 due process rights are being
violated.
The Lavallee court held that such violations are impermissible
for indigent defendants;149 likewise, they should not stand where
Deaf defendants are concerned. The court stated that it could not
"countenance allowing a criminal prosecution to proceed against a
defendant who does not have the benefit of counsel up to and in
cluding a trial on criminal charges for which he could face incarcer
ation."15o Without interpreters, Deaf defendants do not "have the
benefit of counsel" either. Thus, just as the indigent defendants
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Lavallee, 812 N.E.2d at 910.
[d. at 911.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 221, § 92A (2004).
Lavallee, 812 N.E.2d at 912.
Id. at 902.

Telephone Interview with Kellie Hickey, supra note 20.
Lavallee, 812 N.E.2d at 902; MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. 12.
Lavallee, 812 N.E.2d at 902.
/d. at 903.
Id. at 907.
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were released where no counsel could be appointed, so should Deaf
defendants be released where no interpreters can be obtained. l5l
In fashioning this remedy, the court's clear intention was to
pressure the legislature to immediately increase the pay of attor
neys appointed to represent indigent defendants. I52 This intent was
evidenced by the court's reference to several other states' supreme
court cases on this same issue, where those courts did use their in
herent power to temporarily raise the pay of defense attorneys for
indigent defendants pending action from their respective legisla
tures. I53 The court was clearly telling the legislature and the execu
tive (the Attorney General) to take whatever steps were necessary
to ensure the efficient administration of justice by the courts.
The court should make a similar order here: where a case must
be continued more than once due to lack of interpreter availability,
the Deaf defendant should either be released or have his pending
case dismissed. Such an order would put the same kind of pressure
on the legislature to adequately fund MCDHH to enable it to re
cruit, train, and maintain qualified interpreters for court and legal
settings.
B.

Alternatively, the Court Should Order MCDHH to Recruit,
Train, and Retain Interpreters
1.

The Court Should Order MCDHH to Fulfill its
Nondiscretionary Duty

The Supreme Judicial Court can and should issue a writ of
mandamus ordering MCDHH to recruit, train, and retain an ade
151. See id.
152. Id. at 907-08; Spangenberg Group, Major Reform Legislation Passed in Mas
sachusetts, http://www.spangenberggroup.comlnewslMassReformLegislation.html (last
visited May 9, 2007) (citing Lavallee as a catalyst for the legislature's appropriation of
funds to increase the pay of counsel appointed to indigent defendants); Issue
Source.org, Issue: Public Defender Pay, http://www.issuesource.org/issue.cfm?ID=134
(last visited May 9, 2007) (describing Lavallee as the point at which "[t]he uproar
reached a crescendo," which then led to the increase in pay for counsel appointed to
indigent defendants).
153. Lavallee, 812 N.E.2d at 907-08 (citing State ex rei. Wolff v. Ruddy, 617
S.W.2d 64, 67-68 (Mo. 1981); State v. Lynch, 796 P.2d 1150, 1164 (Okla. 1990); N.Y.
County Lawyers' Ass'n v. State, 763 N.Y.S.2d 397 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003)) ("In other
circumstances State courts of last resort have granted preliminary relief in the form of
increased compensation rates, but have simultaneously directed their Legislatures to
amend permanently the compensation rates for indigent representation. A New York
trial court recently issued a permanent injunction directing that counsel be paid ninety
dollars per hour, and removed the statutory fee cap until the Legislature changed the
rates and increased its appropriation for compensation for indigent representation.").
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quate pool of legally qualified interpreters to work in the courts.
Because the Massachusetts legislature has recognized the need for
Deaf defendants to have interpreters in court and legal settings, and
because the fill rate is still so low, there is a conflict. Not only are
Deaf people being denied access to their proceedings, but also, the
courts are unable to adjudicate their criminal cases in a timely
fashion.
Whether the court can intervene to order MCDHH to fulfill its
legislatively mandated duties is governed by the Massachusetts
Constitution's Separation of Powers provision,ls4 which provides:
In the government of this commonwealth, the legislative de
partment shall never exe.cise the executive and judicial powers,
or either of them: the executive shall never exercise the legisla
tive and judicial powers, or either of them: the judicial shall never
exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them:
to the end it may be a government of laws and not of men. ISS

Issuing a writ of mandamus against MCDHH does not violate the
Separation of Powers Clause. First, when an agency violates the
constitutional or statutory rights of an individual, the court may in
tervene and order the agency to fulfill its legislative mandate. Sec
ond, under extraordinary circumstances, and when there is no other
legal remedy, the court can order structural injunctive relief via a
writ of mandamus. The writ of mandamus exists to compel per
formance of a clear, non-discretionary duty.1 s6
When the legislature issues a mandate to an agency, the court
must give deference to that agency's policies in carrying out the
mandate.1 s7 On the rare occasion that an agency does not fulfill its
mandate sufficiently, the court must tread lightly and will assume
the agency is fulfilling its mandate without intervention or supervi
sion. ISS However, "[w]hen an agency's implementation of its regu
154. MCDHH does not, in general, provide direct services like other agencies,
and so it does not have a consumer grievance policy which would include an administra
tive hearing. Telephone conversation with Patricia Ford, Deputy Commissioner of Poli
cies, MCDHH, in Dorchester, Mass. (Jan. 13, 2006). Because of this, it does not fall
within the Massachusetts Administrative Procedure Act (MAPA). Therefore no analy
sis under MAPA will be undertaken in this Note.
155. MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. 30 (a court can only order an executive body to do
something if it does not violate the separation of powers-"the judicial shall never exer
cise the legislative and executive powers or either of them").
156. See generally id.; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 211, § 3 (Z004).
157. Correia v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 605 N.E.2d 1233, 1237 (Mass. 1993).
158. Id. (citing In re McKnight, 550 N.E.Zd 856, 859 (1990» ("Where, as here, an
injunction arguably affects a public agency's exercise of its discretionary functions,
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lations violates the law, it is entirely appropriate for a court to order
relief."159 Also, "[a]n agency regulation that is contrary to the plain
language of the statute and its underlying purpose may be rejected
by the courtS."160 In other words, if an agency's policies overreach
the statute governing it, the court can step in only to ensure the
agency adheres to the letter and spirit of the law.1 61 The court "in
terferes" only to redress the harm the agency causes by overreach
ing its mandate. 162 Thus the court serves a vital role in preserving
the separate functions of each branch of government so that each
may operate smoothly and efficiently.
Here, MCDHH's policies have been, and continue to be, in
contravention of its legislative mandate to provide or ensure the
provision of interpreter services. 163 As such, the court can step
in. 164 MCDHH overreached its mandate when it created a policy
requiring nationally certified legal interpreters from neighboring
states to submit both their certification and further documentation
of their training and work experience to prove that they were quali
fied.1 65 This is a needlessly redundant requirement 166 since national
certification for legal settings exceeds the requirements of the
courts must tread lightly in ordering action contrary to the agency's interpretation of its
own regulations.").
159. Id. (citation omitted).
160. Smith v. Comm'r of Transitional Assistance, 729 N.E.2d 627, 633 (Mass.
2000).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 637. "Although injunctive as well as declaratory relief may sometimes
be necessary to ensure that an agency will fulfil its statutory mandate, 'it has been our
practice to assume that public officials will comply with the law declared by a court and
that consequently injunctive orders are generally unnecessary.'" Id. (quoting Mass.
Coal. for the Homeless v. Sec'y of Human Servs., 511 N.E.2d 603, 614 (Mass. 1987».
163. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, §§ 191-199 (2004).
164. See Smith, 729 N.E.2d at 633.
165. Conversation with Karen Higgins, former Director of CART & Interpreter
Servs., Mass. Comm'n for the Deaf & Hard of Hearing (Jan. 24, 2003). In order to sit
for the SC:L or to be MCDHH-approved, an interpreter must submit proof of hours
mentored by an experienced legal interpreter holding her SC:L, as well as hours worked
in each specific court or legal setting. Once an interpreter passes the SC:L, there is no
need to keep this documentation. See SPECIALIST CERTIFICATE: LEGAL (SC:L) EXAMI
NATION INFORMATION BULLETIN, supra note 78, at 4-5.
166. MCDHH has not officially repealed the old policy since Karen Higgins left
her position as Director of CART and Interpreter Services. However, Amy William
son-Loga told the author that she was offered court and legal work by MCDHH after
Ms. Higgins departure, without requiring any documentation beyond a copy of her
SC:L and the author's recommendation. Conversation with Amy Williamson-Loga, CI
& CT, SC:L (2005).

2007]

DEAF DEFENDANTS AND THE MASSACHUSETTS JUDICIARY

941

MCDHH approval process. 167 MCDHH's policy effectively pre
vented those interpreters from working in Massachusetts, since
once an interpreter is nationally certified for legal assignments,
there is no need to retain documentation of one's mentorship
hours, specific court assignments or training. 168 MCDHH's policies
have made it difficult, if not impossible, for qualified, out-of-state
interpreters to work in Massachusetts.
A parallel can be drawn to the holding in Judge Rotenberg Ed
ucational Center. 169 Although Judge Rotenberg Educational Center
addressed malfeasance, by analogy, the same kind of judicial inter
vention is appropriate in the case of an agency's nonfeasance.
Here, by not recruiting, training, and increasing the pool of quali
fied legal interpreterspO MCDHH is encroaching on the courts'
abilities to administer justice, as proceedings involving Deaf de
fendants cannot go forward without qualified interpreters
present.171
MCDHH has been aware of the severe shortage of legally
qualified interpreters for many years and has done little to remedy
the situation. l72 In 2000, MCDHH co-sponsored, in conjunction
with the Administrative Office of the Trial Court, a single intensive
training for working interpreters who wanted to pursue work in the
courts and legal settings. 173 This has been the only in-court legal
training MCDHH has sponsored since its inception in 1985.
167. See SPECIALIST CERTIFICATE: LEGAL (SC:L) EXAMINATION INFORMATION
BULLETIN, supra note 78, at 11. RID, Inc. requires a performance exam that is evalu
ated by qualified raters from all over the United States. MCDHH only requires train
ing and mentorship, but no performance exam.
168. See supra note 165.
169. Judge Rotenberg Educ. Ctr. v. Comm'r of Dep't of Mental Retardation, 677
N.E.2d 127 (Mass. 1997).
170. Some interpreters have actually been prevented from working within the
state. MCDHH had a policy for several years requiring the same extensive documenta
tion of qualifications for interpreters with their SC:L as those seeking to become
MCDHH approved to work in the courts. This policy was cumbersome and duplicative,
since in order to sit for the SC:L an interpreter must also submit the same documenta
tion to RID, Inc. For those who took their SC:L exams years ago, retrieving that docu
mentation can be problematic and as a result, several interpreters over the years have
declined to "jump through the hoops." Since the RID SC:L exceeds the MCDHH ap
proval system in terms of quality assurance, the policy serves no discernable purpose.
171. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 221, § 92A (2004).
172. See PEOPLE FIRST, supra note 8 (identifying the severe shortage of ASU
English interpreters, and yet only asking for a funding increase for CART reporters).
173. AOTC & MCDHH: THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM WITH EMPHASIS ON
THE MASSACHUSETTS COURT SYSTEM FOR INTERPRETERS SERVING DEAF & HARD OF
HEARING INDIVIDUALS (Lewana Clark ed., 2000) (training manual on file with the
author).
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The law establishing MCDHH clearly states that MCDHH
"shall serve as the principal agency of the commonwealth, on behalf
of deaf ... persons."174 It further states that MCDHH "shall pro
mote development of new services when necessary, ... provide ...
interpreting services," and "determine the need for further services,
mak[ing] recommendations to the governor" as necessaryY5 The
law also states that MCDHH may apply for both federal and local
grants, and it may also apply for private grants and bequests to "aid
in the financing of programs or policies of the commission."176 Al
though MCDHH has often engaged in partnerships with other state
agencies, there is no evidence this author has been able to obtain
that it sought or received private funding to start or maintain vital
projects prior to 2006. 177 The legislature made MCDHH responsi
ble for adequate provision of interpreting services for the courts
and the commission has not fulfilled its duty. Thus, the court can
and should issue a writ of mandamus, ordering MCDHH to fulfill
its legislatively mandated duty.
Similarly, in Sheriff of Suffolk County, the City Council of Bos
ton challenged the propriety of the court's issuance of a mandamus
to compel the City Council to appropriate funds to build a city
jail.t 78 The court stated that the challenge was without merit be
cause "[t]he obligation of the City Council to provide a suitable jail
is not discretionary."179 As noted earlier, the law of mandamus ex
ists to compel performance of a clear, non-discretionary duty on the
part of any agency, court, or governmental entity.18o The court thus
has the right, in extraordinary circumstances, to use a mandamus to
compel an arm of the executive to carry out its non-discretionary
duty, especially when, by failing in such a duty, the executive is en
croaching on another branch of government.
MCDHH has a non-discretionary duty to provide and ensure
the provision of interpreter services,181 a duty it has failed to fulfill.
174. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, § 194 (2004).
175. Id.
176. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, § 192 (2004).
177. In June 2006, MCDHH hired a Projects Coordinator-a person responsible
for seeking out additional sources of funding. Telephone conversation with Mary Kate
Laughran, Human Res. Liaison, Mass. Comm'n for the Deaf & Hard of Hearing in
Dorchester, Mass. (Feb. 27,2006).
178. Att'y Gen. v. Sheriff of Suffolk County, 477 N.E.2d 361, 363-34 (Mass. 1985).
179. Id.
180. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 211, § 3 (2004) ("[Courts] may issue such writs ... as
may be necessary or desirable for the furtherance of justice, the regular execution of the
laws ... and the securing of [the courts'] proper and efficient administration ....").
181. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, §§ 191-199 (2004).
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Aside from partnering with the Administrative Office of the Trial
Court one time in 2000, MCDHH has done little to increase the
pool of interpreters qualified to work in court and legal settings.
MCDHH has not secured permanent funding for training to rem
edy the severe shortage of interpreters for the courts; instead it
funds only sporadic trainings. 182 Such one-time trainings do not
work to increase the pool of legally qualified interpreters, as evi
denced by the static number of interpreters for the courts over the
last thirty years.183 Thus, under the standards set in Sheriff of Suf
folk County and Judge Rotenberg Educational Center, the court can
and should order MCDHH to abide by its non-discretionary man
dates and do whatever it must to increase the pool of interpreters
for the courts.
2.

The Court Should Issue Mandamus in Response to
Legislative and Executive Encroachment on the
Judiciary

In Lavallee, the court ordered injunctive relief enjoining the
courts, the Attorney General, and the District Attorney from hold
ing indigent defendants in jail for more than seven days without an
attorney appointed or continuing cases against indigent defendants
not held in jail for more than forty-five days without an attorney
appointed.1 84 The court was aware that the people of the Common
wealth and legislators would not want dangerous criminals summa
rily released without process or safeguards. 18s The clear purpose of
this injunctive relief was to put direct pressure on the legislature to
act to raise the pay for attorneys appointed to represent indigent
defendants.1 86 The court should put similar pressure on MCDHH.
Because the legislature has not adequately funded MCDHH to
recruit, train, and maintain a sufficient number of qualified inter
preters to work in the courts, and MCDHH has not taken adequate .
steps to increase the pool of such qualified interpreters, a writ of
mandamus would be warranted. Massachusetts General Laws
chapter 211, section 3 states in pertinent part that "[courts] may
182. For example, as of the writing of this Note, MCDHH is currently offering a
multi-part out-of-court training for interpreters who want to work in non-court legal
settings. Flyer from the Mass. Comm'n for the Deaf & Hard of Hearing, Training for
Out-of-Court Legal Assignments (Sept. 2006) (on file with author).
183. Interview with Joan Wattman, supra note 28.
184. Lavallee v. Justices in the Hampden Superior Court, 812 N.E.2d 895, 912
(Mass. 2004).
185. Id. at 910.
186. See id. at 899-902.
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issue such writs ... as may be necessary or desirable for the further
ance of justice, the regular execution of the laws ... and the secur
ing of [the courts'] proper and efficient administration."187 Without
enough interpreters to serve all Deaf parties in the Commonwealth,
the judiciary cannot mete out justice in a timely or efficient manner.
Justice cannot be administered without the ability of the court to
secure a defendant's presence at trial,188 "The ability to secure a
defendant's presence at trial is of fundamental importance to the
basic functioning of the judiciary, without which justice cannot be
administered."189 According to Massachusetts law, without an in
terpreter a Deaf defendant is effectively not present and the pro
ceedings cannot go forward. 190
By enacting laws making MCDHH the only agency that can
both qualify and refer interpreters for the courts, and then failing to
adequately fund such a mandate, the legislature has contributed to
the shortage of interpreters that now encroaches upon the judici
ary's ability to administer justice. 191 As such, the court can order
MCDHH to secure adequate permanent funding for annual inter
preter training. In the alternative, the court can order the Com
monwealth to release all Deaf defendants whose cases have been
continued more than once due to lack of interpreter services, with
the intention of pressuring the legislature to appropriate funds to
MCDHH for recruitment, training, and retention of interpreters
qualified to work in the courts and other legal settings.
C.

Injunctive Relief Would Not Violate the Separation of Powers

The circumstances under which injunctive relief can be granted
are limited by the Separation of Powers Clause of the Massachu
setts Constitution;192 and as the law of mandamus states unequivo
187. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 211, § 3 (2004).
188. Querubin v. Commonwealth, 795 N.E.2d 534, 540 (Mass. 2003).
189. Id.
190. See MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 221, § 92A (2004).
191. There is no doubt that the letter and spirit of the Interpreter Law are cor
rect-we have already seen that requiring interpreters for court proceedings is the only
way Deaf defendants can meaningfully participate. Further, it is also correct that
MCDHH-in conjunction with Massachusetts Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf and
the Massachusetts State Association of the Deaf-should be the qualifying and refer
ring body. High standards for interpreters working in the courts are critical to ensuring
that Deaf defendants actually have access to the proceedings. See generally REpORT ON
INTERPRETER SERVICES IN THE VERMONT COURTS, supra note 59; LaVigne & Vernon,
supra note 13; Berko, supra note 13.
192. MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. 30.
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cally, those circumstances must be extraordinary.193 In contrast to
Lavallee and Sheriff of Suffolk County, the Supreme Judicial Court
in Commonwealth v. Leno held that it was not appropriate to issue
injunctive relief. 194 But in that case, the facts did not warrant it as
they do here. The court stated that the separation of powers as
articulated in article 30 prevents the '''judiciary [from] substituting
its notions of correct policy for that of a popularly elected Legisla
ture.' "195 In explaining the crucial importance of the separation of
powers, the court stated that "[w]hether a statute is wise or effec
tive is not within the province of courts," and that the court's only
role is to determine whether the statute is constitutional, giving
great deference to the presumption that it is.l 96
In Leno, the defendants, who were trying to prevent the spread
of HIV/AIDS among intravenous drug users, were convicted of
needle distribution in violation of a Massachusetts statute prohibit
ing the sale or distribution of any drug paraphernalia without a pre
scription.l 97 The basis for their appeal was the trial court's denial of
the defendants' requested jury instruction of necessity-that they
had no other legal way of preventing the spread of AIDS because
of the statute preventing needle distribution. 198 In affirming the
trial court's verdict, the court made clear that the defendants had
alternative legal recourse through the legislative process; that they
could petition their legislators to change the statute prohibiting
needle distribution.1 99 The court's point was that if the non-elected
judiciary stepped in and in effect assumed a legislative function, the
right of the people to create constitutional laws would be emascu
lated, and as such the court's action would be a violation of the
constitution. 20o
In contrast, by enacting laws regarding Deaf people and inter
preters in the courts without granting adequate funding to
MCDHH, the legislature has impermissibly encroached on the judi
ciary's ability to function smoothly, efficiently, and without oppres
sion of the parties to its proceedings. In fact, Deaf defendants, like
the hypothetical John Sandoval, suffer egregious oppression each
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

ch. 211, § 3 (2004).
Commonwealth v. Leno, 616 N.E.2d 453 (Mass. 1993).
Id. at 457 (quoting Zayre Corp. v. Att'y Gen., 362 N.E.2d 878 (Mass. 1977)).
Id.
Id. at 454.
Id.
Id. at 457.
Id.
MASS. GEN. LAWS
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time their cases are continued and they have to stay in jail longer
than their hearing counterparts would have. Unlike in Leno, there
is nothing for the legislature to act on here. The legislature has
already passed the Interpreter Law, which expressly protects Deaf
defendants' constitutional rights. 201
The problem, as in Lavallee, is that the legislature has not com
mitted nearly enough funds to MCDHH to allow it to carry out its
legislative mandate to ensure the provision of interpreters for the
courtS. 202 In Lavallee, the legislature's inadequate appropriation of
funds to CPCS led to the underpayment of defense attorneys ap
pointed to represent indigent defendants, which ultimately led to
the crisis-level shortage of such attorneys in the courts. So here did
the legislature's inadequate appropriation of funds both to
MCDHH for training and recruitment of interpreters, and to the
Administrative Office of the Trial Court for adequate payment,
lead to a similar shortage. 203 Thus, the interpreter shortage here is
distinguishable from the situation in Leno, and instead, analogous
to Lavallee's shortage of defense attorneys. The shortage of quali
fied interpreters for the courts that Massachusetts now faces has
arisen as a result of inadequate funding for an existing legislative
mandate, and it would therefore not violate the separation of pow
ers for the court to issue a writ of mandamus.

201. The legislature cannot solve the problem of the lack of interpreter services
by repealing the Interpreter Law. Even though the Interpreter Law does not create an
independent right of action, John Sandoval and his co-plaintiffs could still sue the Com
monwealth for violation of their constitutional rights, as the indigent defendants did in
Lavallee.
202. As evidenced by the lack of success in providing only sporadic trainings,
MCDHH would need to have a permanent line item in its budget for annual legal inter
preter trainings in order to increase the pool of interpreters available to meet the
courts' needs.
203. In 2004, the minimum standard pay for interpreters for court and legal set
tings in several states, including Washington, D.C., was approximately $60.00 per hour
with a four-hour minimum. Informal Survey of Interpreters at the Iron Sharpens Iron
Conference for Legal Interpreters, in Atlanta, GA (May 2004). In New York, interpret
ers earn up to $100 per hour. Conversation with Molly Wilson, Court & Legal Inter
preter, in Modena, NY (Dec. 2006). In Massachusetts, it was $40.00 per hour until
January 1, 2007. Now it is $200 for half a day (four hours) and $300 for all day (no
lunch included and regardless of how long the workday goes). Administrative Office
for the Trial Court Official Time Sheet; Conversations with legal interpreters Joan
Wattman, Bonnie Kraft, and Carol Fay, regarding why qualified legal interpreters pre
fer not to work in the courts over the period from 2003 to 2005.
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CONCLUSION

The Massachusetts courts have effectively been rendered im
potent when it comes to dealing with Deaf defendants. Due to the
severe shortage of legally qualified interpreters for the courts, pro
ceedings that would otherwise move along for hearing defendants
are delayed, and sometimes grind to a halt where Deaf defendants
are concerned. Even though John Sandoval is a hypothetical char
acter, he represents a composite of what real Deaf defendants suf
fer. Through their collective nonfeasance, both MCDHH and the
legislature have impermissibly encroached on the judiciary, inter
fered with its ability to secure the legal presence of Deaf defendants
at its proceedings, and thereby violated Deaf defendants' statutory
and constitutional rights. The court has no choice but to act to safe
guard its autonomy and its ability to operate timely and efficiently,
as well as to protect Deaf defendants' rights. Injunctive relief is
warranted here and judicial precedent supports it. Deaf defend
ants' rights depend on it.
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